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Price for nearly all basic commodity rose at unprecedented rates throughout early 2008, only to
fall nearly as fast as financial markets and global economies began to collapse.  Rising food
prices in 2008 led to concerns that commodity price spikes would lead to more general food
inflation, but by early 2009 interest focused more on the seeming inability of food prices to fall
back down with commodity prices.  This study provides an empirical investigation into the pass-
through of commodity prices to retail prices for two different types of food products: potatoes
and fluid milk.  The results show that pass-through depends on the nature of the food in question,
but is generally consistent with theoretical models of pricing by sellers of multiple, differentiated
products.  In particular, pass-through rates tend to be lower for processed (differentiated)
products during periods of falling input prices than when input prices are rising.  For less
processed products, pass-through tends to be higher during regimes of both rising and falling
input prices.  Our results show that pass-through depends on the degree of pricing power
possessed by all channel members and, more generally, suggest a nuanced approach to
understanding retail food price inflation.  
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Introduction
During the past two years, policymakers have taken notable concern of the impact of commodity
price fluctuations on the well-being of U.S. households in general, and particularly those facing
financial hardship (Dessus, Herrera, and de Hoyos, 2008).  Indeed, prices for important
production inputs such as wheat, corn, oats, rice, and potatoes increased by 51, 56, 37, 72, and 30
percent respectively from June 2007 to June 2008 (Farmdoc) so there was a general concern that
food price inflation would follow accordingly.  Although the world financial crisis that arose in
late 2008 promised even greater hardship for the newly unemployed and underemployed, the
subsequent economic slowdown also brought the hope of lower food prices as commodity prices
began retreating to more normal levels.  For example, by June 2009 wheat, corn, oat, rice, and
potato prices fell 25, 26, 30, 13, and 12 percent respectively from their June 2008 levels
(Farmdoc).  However, analysts in the business media and government agencies observed that
supermarket prices were declining at a much slower rate than those of production input prices,
raising concerns that market intermediaries were taking advantage of the situation and profiting
from price volatility and consumer uncertainty (Boyle, 2009).  Whether their observations
constitute evidence of market power or the normal fluctuations of prices in a complex vertical
channel, however, is an unresolved empirical question.  Consequently, the goal of this research is
to better understand the phenomena of price pass-through in the food marketing channel and how
it is influenced by vertical strategic interaction between manufacturers and retailers.  
Heterogeneity in production, marketing and distribution systems means that it is generally
not possible to draw sweeping conclusions regarding the pass-through of commodity prices to
retail prices of all foods.  Nonetheless, theory provides some general concepts that guide our2
understanding and our expectations regarding how rates of wholesale-retail price pass through
should behave when input prices are changing.  First, the level of concentration and subsequent
market power exertion by any channel members has a direct effect on theoretical rates of price
pass-through.  Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) show, for example, that input price changes are
passed along the channel at the rate of 100% for perfectly competitive sellers, and 50% for
monopolist sellers.  On the other hand, buying power by powerful monopsonist manufacturers or
retailers results in cost reductions via their potential to refuse input price increases (Hamilton and
Sunding 1997).  Empirical research by Martinez (2008) and Volpe and Lavoie (2008) provide
supporting evidence for this latter form of market concentration by showing that the growth of
supercenters (who arguably exercise significant buying power with upstream suppliers) has
reduced retail food prices in many markets. 
Second, the degree to which wholesalers pass input price changes on to retailers depends
on the substitutability of inputs required to manufacture a particular food product (Gardner,
1975).  In other words, more inputs required to produce an end product, the least likely it is for a
price increase in a small number of these inputs to have a notable effect on the price of the final
good.  This notion was central to the arguments of Leibtag (2008) who suggested that, regardless
of skyrocketing commodity prices, consumer food prices would likely adjust only a little because
food commodities only constitute a portion of their production process.  However, while this
argument may hold for heavily processed foods such as ready to eat cereal or frozen entrees, it is
less likely to apply to minimally processed foods such as fresh fruits and vegetables.
Third, increases in input prices tend to be passed along to end consumers much quicker
than price reductions.  Market power exertion is often cited as the culprit of such asymmetric3
price transmission.  However, several studies highlight institutional mechanisms that could
account for such behavior.  For example, Richards and Patterson (2005) show that price rigidity
could be the result of market uncertainty and the fixed costs associated with changing shelf
prices.  Alternatively, collusive agreements between channel members could result in trigger-
price strategies that are consistent with pass-through asymmetries (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986;
Lewis, 2004).
   In this study, we estimate the relationship between commodity price inflation and retail
food prices, while testing hypotheses regarding the nature of competition within the food
marketing channel.  In doing so, we contribute to the literature on price pass-through by
accounting for structural attributes of the food marketing channel that are likely to affect the role
of commodity price inflation in determining prices at the supermarket.  First, we allow for
vertical strategic interaction between manufacturers and the downstream retail market where
competition involves portfolios of both national brands and private label products.  This
approach is consistent with other structural marketing studies that highlight the need to control
for the proper mode of competition between channel members (Sudhir, 2001; Kim and Cotterill,
2008).  Second, to highlight the possible differences between pass-through-rates for products that
differ by degree of manufacturer processing, we apply our model of manufacturer-retailer pricing
to two commonly purchased food products – potatoes, and fluid milk.  Finally, we contribute
methodologically by estimating the first model of manufacturer/retailer pricing that includes both
a structural model of the vertical distribution channel and a model of asymmetric price
adjustment.
Our findings provide evidence that commodity-inflation pass-through depends critically4
on the product market in question as the nature of the vertical channel for potatoes differs
significantly from that of fluid milk.  Specifically, for potatoes we find that both retailers and
manufacturers narrow margins during periods of commodity price inflation and expand margins
when commodity prices fall.  This finding is consistent with sellers taking advantage of short-
term profits made available by consumers who still maintain high price expectations.  This
outcome may also be the result of more basic competitive forces.  For example, Hamilton (2009)
shows that in markets involving multiple differentiated products that Bertrand-Nash competition
can cause overshifting any increases in input prices.   For milk, we find that retailers and
manufacturers narrow margins when input prices rise as well as when they fall.  Because retail
markets for milk are more competitive than for potatoes, retailers are reluctant to lose market
share by raising milk prices when pressures to do so arise.  Without higher retail prices, retailers
cannot pay higher wholesale prices so both sides of the vertical channel are forced to reduce their
margins.  When input prices are falling, the relative competitiveness of retail markets again
dominates – retailers reduce their prices in order to gain market share, reducing the derived
demand for milk at the wholesale level.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  We first present a brief overview of
theoretical models of cost pass-through to retail prices.  As part of this section we highlight our
expectation that the structure of the product market will play a critical role in determining the
impact of input price inflation on retail prices.  Next, we outline a structural model of retail
pricing consisting of a discrete choice model of demand and a two-stage retailer/manufacturer
price optimization framework on the supply side.  In the third section we describe our potato and
milk data and draw attention to the differences between the two product categories in terms of Holloway (1991) estimates the elasticity of the retail-farm price ratio with respect to marketing input
1
costs. This can be interpreted as analogous, but not identical to, our definition of a pass-through rate.
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pricing dynamics and processing intensity.  The fourth section contains our explanation of the
estimation and identification of our model.  Empirical results as well as the implications of our
findings are presented in the fifth section, while a final section provides conclusions and
suggestions for future research.  
Economic Model of Input Price Pass-Through
The rate of cost pass-through depends on the structure of the market.  Gardner (1975) shows that
the degree to which downstream prices respond to upstream cost changes depends on the
elasticities of supply and demand for the farm and non-farm inputs, but he assumes competition
throughout.  In a more general model, Bulow and Pfeiderer (1983) show that the retail price
change in response to a change in upstream cost should be equal to the change in cost, multiplied
by a ratio of the demand curve slope to the slope of the marginal revenue curve.  Similarly, but in
a more complete model of the marketing channel, Holloway (1991) extends the Gardner (1975)
model to include deviations from competitive pricing of farm commodities, and finds pass-
through rates generally less than 50%.   Their analyses, however, do not consider differentiated
1
product markets.
While much of the previous research is cast in terms of undifferentiated commodity
markets, Sudhir (2001) presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of cost pass-through in a
highly differentiated environment – the U.S. automobile industry.  His findings are consistent Anderson, de Palma and Kreider (2001) arrive at the somewhat surprising result that overshifting an ad
2
valorem or unit tax under Bertrand-Nash competition in differentiated products will occur just as in a homogeneous
Cournot oligopoly such as in Delipalla and Keen (1992).  
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with predictions from theoretical research, namely that the pass-through rate will be higher in
perfect competition or in Bertrand-Nash pricing games than in monopoly or Cournot
competition.  Similarly, Moorthy (2005) provides a theoretical analysis of price setting by
competing, multiple-differentiated-product retailers and demonstrates the importance of strategic
complementarity in setting prices.  Kim and Cotterill (2008) find a similar result in a context
closer to the one considered here: the U.S. processed cheese market.  More recently, Hamilton
(2009) addresses the joint effect of pricing and variety selection among multi-product retailers in
leading to pass-through rates that may exceed 100%.  Although the data for this study do not
describe sales by individual retailers, we account for this effect by including demand
relationships among a wide variety of potentially complementary products.  
Models of tax incidence in public economics arrive at an analogous conclusion with
respect to ad valorem or unit taxes – that the pass-through rate of ad valorem taxes can be higher
in more competitive pricing environments than less (Anderson, de Palma and Kreider, 2001;
Delipalla and Keen, 1992) depending upon the price-reaction of rival firms.   Froeb, Taschantz
2
and Werden (2005), however, demonstrate that it is not necessarily the elasticity of demand that
determines the pass-through rate, but rather the curvature of demand.  They use this insight to
explain why some mergers result in large price increases absent synergies, and yet pass any cost
reductions through at a relatively high rate.  Consequently, the empirical model developed in this
paper is as flexible as possible, with the curvature determined by the interaction between
consumer heterogeneity and product attributes (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995; Nevo, 2001). 7
Moreover, we allow for the possibility that conduct, as measured by the deviation from
competitive behavior, may indeed be endogenous to changes in upstream cost as rising prices
may provide either manufacturers or retailers a “smokescreen” to increase their margins. 
Empirical Model of Pass-Through in Differentiated Product Markets
Overview
In this section, we describe the structural model used to estimate the pass-through rate of farm
prices to retail prices for two fundamentally different food categories, one minimally processed
and one involving relatively more processing: fresh potatoes and milk.  These categories are
selected because they represent different levels of value-added from the base food commodity
and, as such, should be impacted to differing degrees by commodity price inflation.  In each case,
the econometric model is based on a two-stage game theoretic framework of the food supply
chain.  Namely, suppliers are assumed to behave as Stackelberg leaders in a two-stage pricing
game in which suppliers pose the terms of supply contracts to retailers, who then accept or reject
all terms of the contract depending on the incentives provided (Sudhir, 2001 and Villas-Boas and
Zhao, 2005, and others).  In the second-stage of the game, retailers who accept the contracts set
retail prices and consumer demand follows.  As is common in empirical models of vertical
strategic interaction, we solve and estimate the game backward, beginning by estimating
consumer demand, solving the retailer problem and then estimating the suppliers’ problem
conditional on retail demand elasticities and pricing conduct. 
Within this traditional structural industrial organization framework, we estimate the8
impact of commodity price inflation on retail pass-through, retail margins, supplier margins and,
hence, market power at both levels, by introducing “conduct parameters” into the retail and
supplier models (Draganska and Klapper, 2007; Richards, Hamilton and Patterson, 2009;
Richards and Hamilton, 2006).  Unlike models of conjectural variations, the conduct parameters
in this model are atheoretic, meaning that they do not represent any postulate over retailer or
manufacturer behavior, but rather measure the degree of departure of the industry from
completely competitive or Bertrand outcomes.  By allowing these conduct parameters to vary
with both time and the level of input prices, the interaction effect allow us to determine the
impact of input price changes not only on marginal cost, but pass-through and market power.  
Consumer Demand
Consumer demand is represented by a random utility model in which consumers are assumed to
make a discrete choice of one product (brand or variety) from among those represented in our
retail data sample, or some other product from another outlet, which is defined as the outside
option.  The utility consumer i obtains from consuming product j during week t is a function of
jt ijt jk the product’s price (p  ), product-specific preferences, ã , and a set of product attributes (x ):
j where the product attributes include a binary discount variable (d) that assumes a value of 1 if
the product is reduced in price by at least 10% from one week to the next, and then returned to its
jj previous value in the following week, an interaction term between the discount and price (dp)
(1) Scanner data typically includes only supermarkets with $2.0 million + in sales, and excludes stores that do
3
not participate in national data syndication efforts: Wal-Mart, Costco, and Target notable among them. 
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jt and a time trend, t,  î  is an error term that accounts for all product-specific variation in demand
that is unobserved to the researcher such as the perceived quality, the amount of shelf-space
ijt allocated to it, or unmeasured advertising, and g  is an i.i.d. type I extreme value error term that
accounts for consumer-specific heterogeneity in preferences.  With this error assumption, the
utility specification in (1) implies a logit discrete choice demand model.  
Because consumers can buy either potatoes or milk from sources other than those
captured by our scanner data, we extend the simple logit model to consider the hierarchical
nature of a consumer’s choice process: consumers first choose whether to buy from the
traditional supermarkets described by our data, or another source, and then the specific brand or
ijt variety.   Consequently, we modify the distributional assumption governing g  by allowing it to
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follow instead a Generalized Extreme Value (GEV, McFadden, 1978) distribution.  With the
GEV assumption, we allow for differing degrees of substitution among products within each
group: supermarket purchases and others.  In terms of the utility model introduced in (1), the
GEV extension involves including a composed error such that: 
ijt where ô  is an error-component (Cardell, 1997) that makes the entire term: 
extreme-value distributed as well.  The aggregate probability that consumer i purchases product j
in group J, or the market share, is given by the product of the conditional probability of buying
(2)10
within a particular group and the probability of the group as a whole, or:  
j where ä is the mean utility of product j, or the part of utility that does not vary over consumers,
i j|J J and n is the part that does, s  is the share of product j among all supermarket sales, s  is the
share of group J in overall volume sales, and   represents the inclusive value
from purchasing from group J so that    Faced with a total market size of M,
therefore, the quantity sold of product j is written as:   
As is well known, however, the GEV model still suffers from the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property within groups, which means that the substitution elasticities
between products depends only on their market shares and not on more fundamental attributes
that are likely to influence demand.  Consequently, we allow the product-preference and marginal
utility of income parameters in (3) to vary over consumers in a random way (Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes, 1995; Nevo, 2001; McFadden and Train, 2000).  Specifically, the marginal utility of




0l where  á  is the mean price response across all consumers, á is the effect of attribute l on price
i i sensitivity, z is vector of individual attributes and í is the random, consumer-specific variation
á in response with parameter ó .  Similar to Erdem (1996) and Nair, Dube, and Chintagunta
(2005), we also assume that product-specific preferences depend on the attributes of each
individual:
0j l i where ã  is the mean preference for product j, ã is a vector of individual attribute effects, and ì
is the random, consumer-specific effect on product preferences.  In contrast to the IIA property of
a simple logit model, the heterogeneity assumption in (4) creates a general pattern of substitution
over alternatives j through the unobserved, random part of the utility function given in (1).  Non-
IIA substitution is critical in models of differentiated product pricing because inferences
regarding either upstream or downstream market power would otherwise be entirely confounded
by mis-estimates of the partial elasticity of demand facing each product. 
With a discrete choice model of demand, it is assumed that each consumer purchases only
one unit of the chosen product.  Because our data measures aggregate market shares, therefore,
we aggregate over the distribution of consumer heterogeneity to arrive at an expression for the
share of each product variety of the entire market.  Because the random-parameters logit model
introduces a large number of parameters relative to the simple logit model, we follow Nevo
(2001), among others, and write the indirect utility function in terms of two sets of variables –
those that are assumed to be random and those that are not:   
(5) This “monopoly retailer” model is common in the empirical industrial organization literature (Slade,
3
1995; Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005) and, although not strictly true in most markets is a near approximation given the
survey data reported in Slade (1995) that supports a model in which shoppers choose a single outlet for their
groceries.  Individual stores are thus appropriately characterized as local monopolies.   
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jt ijt where ä  is the mean level of utility that varies over products, but not consumers, and ö  is the
ii idiosyncratic part that varies by consumer and product.  Define the densities of ì and í as f(ì)
and g(í), respectively, so that the market share of product j, obtained by integrating over the
distributions reflecting consumer heterogeneity, becomes: 
which can then be estimated in aggregate data using simulated maximum likelihood (SML)
algorithms (Train, 2003).  Simulation methods are required to estimate the demand-side model
because there is no closed form-expression for market share as in the simple logit case (Berry,
1994). It is this expression for aggregate demand, therefore, that channel members consider in
forming their pricing decisions. 
Retail and Wholesale Pricing Model
Given the aggregate nature of our data, we characterize the marketing channel as consisting of a
single, multi-product retailer, and multiple, single-product suppliers.   Although there are clearly
3
many retailers, and multi-product suppliers in reality, we gain nothing by modeling this structure,
(6)
(7) We refer to the wholesale price throughout as the price paid by the retailer, which differs from the grower
4
price by packing costs, shipping costs and any other contractual terms specified by the wholesaler.  
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because our focus is on market power relationships between the retail sector and consumers
downstream, and the retailer and suppliers upstream. Consistent with prior evidence on the
vertical structure of food-product markets, the retailer behaves as a Stackelberg follower:
suppliers specify a wholesale price given their expectations of how the retailer will respond, and
the retailer then sets prices paid by consumers (Kadiyali, Vilcassim, and Chintagunta, 1996,
1999).  We solve for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in the usual way: by working
backward from the retailer to the supplier’s problem.
Beginning with the retailer decision, and suppressing the time period index (t) for clarity,
j the retailer sets a price for each product, p, each week to solve the following problem: 
jj j where  M is total market demand, w is the wholesale price, r are unit retailing costs, and s is the
market share defined above.   Retailing costs are assumed to be constant, which is plausible
4
given the share of store-sales accounted for by any individual product.  Under the manufacturer-
Stackelberg assumption, the retailer sets prices taking wholesale prices as given.   
We assume the retailer sets prices as a local monopolist selling a differentiated-product
and thus internalizes all intra-store pricing externalities (behaves as a perfect category manager). 
Consequently, the retailer’s first-order condition for product j is given by: 
(8)14
for all J products in the store.  Stacking the first-order conditions for all products and solving for
retail prices in matrix notation gives: 
where p is an J x 1 vector of prices, w is a J x 1 vector of wholesale prices, r is a J x 1 vector of
p product-specific retailing input prices, S is an J x 1 vector of market shares, and S  is a J x J
matrix of share-derivatives with respect to all retail prices.  Because the suppliers take the
retailer’s optimal response into account in setting upstream prices, equation (10) represents the
retail decision rule that frames their pricing decisions. 
Each supplier is assumed to set wholesale prices in order to maximize the surplus over
production costs for the particular brand or variety he or she sells, conditional on the retailer’s
response.  Again assuming individual wholesalers sell all products sold by the retailer, we index
the supplier model over individual products, j, and write supplier profit as:  
j where c is the (constant) production cost of product j incurred by the supplier and the other
variables are as described above.  The first-order condition for the supplier is taken with respect




which is simply an expression of the supplier’s vertical pricing problem, taking the retailer’s best
reply into account and recognizing that the supplier has to take into account the effect of his own
price changes on the retail price of all other products.  As in Sudhir (2001) and Villas-Boas and
Zhao (2005), we derive expressions for the wholesale price derivatives by totally differentiating
the retail first-order conditions to find:    
jk which can be simplified by defining a J x J matrix G with typical element g  such that: 
Using this expression to write the wholesale margin and stacking over all suppliers, the margin is
written as: 
N where I  is a J x J identity matrix and * indicates element-by-element multiplication. 




(15) Detailed derivations of each matrix are available from the authors, but are similar to Villas-Boas and Zhao
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(2005) and Berto Villas-Boas (2007). Note that these parameters are also interpreted as measuring the extent of
deviation from the maintained Bertrand-Nash assumption. 
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the retail margin equation (10) to arrive at a single-equation expression for the total retail-cost
margin:   
which allows the estimation of pass-through rates, both from retailing and wholesaling costs to
retail prices and, perhaps more importantly, from farm prices to retail prices.   
To this point, all of parameters required to identify the equilibrium margins are contained
p in the demand side estimates (S  and G) and from the estimated marginal cost functions.  
5
Marginal retailing and wholesaling costs, in turn, are estimated as linear functions of input prices,
rw v  and v  such that:  and   for retailing
j and wholesaling costs, respectively, where b is the farm-price received from wholesalers at the
grower level.  Wholesaling costs are assumed to be separable between agricultural (farm
purchases of potatoes) and non-agricultural inputs (Gardner, 1975).  These functions are estimated
after substituting the demand parameters into (16) in the two-step procedure described below. 
Because wholesale prices are unobservable, however, we need a method of estimating the effect
of commodity price changes, through wholesale prices, to retail prices.    
Estimating Farm-Retail Pass-Through Rates




In the empirical pass-through rate literature (Kim and Cotterill, 2008; Besanko, Dube, and Gupta,
2005) it is typically assumed that pass-through is instantaneous as the empirical models are
inherently static.  However, many others provide evidence of asymmetric price adjustment, so the
weight of the empirical research suggests otherwise (Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert, 1997, for
example).    There are essentially two ways of accounting for dynamic behavior of pass-through
6
rates: (1) an atheoretic, time-series approach that focuses on the dynamic time series properties of
the relationship between wholesale and retail prices, and (2) structural models that investigate the
rate at which retail-wholesale price relationships return to some maintained equilibrium.  Because
we believe vertical relationships in the food industry are characterized by somewhat complicated
non-competitive equilibria, to not take the nature of the game into account in explaining price
adjustment would be a fundamental misspecification of the market.  However, many theoretical
models do not adequately account for the rich dynamics involved.  Consequently, we provide a
synthesis of these approaches and test for asymmetry in retail adjustment to changes in wholesale
prices within the context of a theoretically-consistent model of vertical supply relationships. 
In retail food markets, the implicit assumption is that both the retailer and suppliers
optimize according to the structure of the game and, as such, there is no deviation from the
theoretical equilibrium.  To explain price dynamics in food markets, we allow for deviation from
the monopoly / Nash equilibrium to occur for two reasons: (1) market power relationships among
retailers or suppliers that differ from the game described above, and (2) asymmetric price
adjustment that can arise for any of the reasons cited by Lewis (2004), namely consumer search,18
volatility, or market power itself.  
As Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) and Draganska and Klapper (2007) suggest, observed
margins may differ from those expected under the maintained monopoly / Nash pricing model. 
While errors in optimization are always a possibility, there may also be structural reasons for
deviations from the theoretical equilibrium.  Market power, either more or less than expected,
contractual relationships or more subtle forms of strategic behavior are all possibilities.  Another
possibility is that generalized commodity price inflation creates an environment of price
uncertainty that allows retailers and / or wholesalers to temporarily raise margins.  In order to test
hypotheses regarding the fundamental causes of asymmetrical pass-through, we focus on the
effects of price inflation, or the rates of change in commodity prices, on pass-through rates from
the farm to wholesale level and from wholesale to retail.  
We allow for deviations from the hypothesized profit maximizing choices by the retailer
and the Bertrand-Nash behavior by the wholesalers by introducing parameters in (16) that measure
the deviation of the retail margin (ö) and supplier margin (è) from the maintained assumption at
each level: 
where both ö and è are functions of exogenous variables that are thought to influence each
player’s ability to earn positive margins, namely upward and downward movements in key input
prices.  
Retailers claim that food manufacturers use environments in which commodity (input)
prices are rising to increase their margins (Boyle, 2009).  At the same time, food manufacturers
(17) Frey and Manera (2007) provide a detailed and exhaustive review of the empirical literature on this issue. 
7
 Others have extended this ECM approach to account for the possibility that underlying pressures to
8
change retail prices must overcome an unobserved threshold value before eliciting a response in the shelf price. 
Such threshold cointegration models (Azzam, 1999; Goodwin and Piggott, 2001; Abdulai, 2002) represent a
valuable contribution to the literature given the observation that retail prices are indeed costly to adjust.  
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argue that contractual obligations, inventory accounting and other rigidities prevent them from
changing prices with every fluctuation in the commodity market and, moreover, that retailers are
not passing through wholesale price changes to the consumer.  Consequently, the influence of
retailer and wholesaler markup behavior on retail prices when commodity prices are changing is
an unresolved empirical issue.  
Early econometric models of asymmetric price adjustment considered current downstream
prices as functions of upward and downward movements in upstream prices (Tweeten and
Quance, 1968) or cumulative price movements (Houck, 1977; Ward, 1982; Kinnucan and Forker,
1987).  More recently, however, others have recognized that asymmetrical price adjustments must
take into account the econometric implications of a long-run equilibrium between two price
series.   Namely, if both price series are non-stationary and integrated of order 1, then there may
7
exist a long run relationship between the variables expressed in first differences.  Importantly, any
conclusions formed regarding asymmetric price adjustment in levels could very well be in error
because the underlying relationship between the two variables may indeed be spurious.  Granger
and Newbold (1974) were the first to recognize the importance of considering whether or not two
time series are cointegrated, while Granger and Lee (1989) develop the error correction model
(ECM) to deal with this problem in a consistent way.   Despite the fact that the ECM approach has
8
become very popular, there is some question as to whether, over a relatively short, high-frequency
time series of retail and wholesale potato and milk prices, the price series are indeed cointegrated.   Conceptually, the deviation parameter can vary by product j because commodity-price inflation is
9
product-specific.  However, to avoid a proliferation of parameters in the empirical model, we restrict the deviation
parameters to be equal. 
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In our application, it is not likely that either series, constrained by production costs and
low-cost imports, will exhibit a drift without bound over the sample period.  Nonetheless, we
conduct a series of unit root tests (Phillips-Perron) prior to specifying the final version of the
price-adjustment model.  We find that we reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for both retail
and wholesale price series, for each panel member in both datasets.  Consequently, we specify the
econometric price-adjustment model without adjusting for error correction, but in a manner that is
still able to test for asymmetry in the adjustment of retail prices to changes in grower prices.
In order to test our hypotheses regarding the fundamental causes of asymmetrical cost
pass-through, we provide for two avenues of adjustment asymmetry: directly from farm prices to
retail prices, and through retailers’ and wholesalers’ markup behavior.  Without a theoretical basis
to guide a choice of functional form for the deviation parameters, we write both as linear
functions of a constant term as well as upward and downward changes in commodity prices:
j,t-ô  and  where dw  is the change in wholesale prices from period t - ô to
period t,  ä  = 1 when prices rise and ä = 1 when they fall.  Therefore, we write both deviation
+-





In this way, we test whether retailers or wholesalers, respectively, face greater competitive
pressures in an inflationary environment, as argued by Lewis (2004), or regard inflationary periods
as an opportunity to exploit buyers’ confusion over what the true price should be, as suggested by
Benabou and Gertler (1996).  
The deviation parameters are interpreted as measuring the extent of deviation from the
maintained pricing game by either the retailer (ö) or the wholesalers (è) (Villas-Boas and Zhao,
2005; Draganska and Klapper, 2007).  In the case of the retailer, the maintained hypothesis is
monopoly pricing, so an estimated value of ö above 1.0 suggests that the retailer prices higher
than the monopoly level.  Conversely, if ö < 1.0, then the retailer prices less than a perfect
monopoly would.  Upstream, the maintained hypothesis is that wholesalers price as Bertrand-
Nash competitors with respect to each other.  In this case, a value of è > 1.0 indicates greater-
than-Bertrand pricing and è < 1.0 suggests pricing that is more competitive than Bertrand.  In the
extreme, if è = 0, then wholesalers do not take advantage of the differentiated nature of their
products and price as purely competitive commodity sellers.  We have no priors on the values of
these parameters in relation to either the maintained or competitive benchmarks given that there
are structural arguments supporting either competitive or non-competitive pricing by either the
retailer or the set of wholesalers.  
Commodity price inflation has an asymmetric effect on retail prices if we reject the null
12 hypothesis that ö  = ö .  In this study, however, our concern lies more in the sign of each
1 parameter than whether they differ.  Specifically, if ö  > 0, then retail margins widen during
periods of commodity-price inflation.  In other words, the retailer prices less competitively as a
result of commodity price inflation, possibly because an environment of rising prices provides the Note that this interpretation assumes that the “menu cost” of price adjustment at retail are either not a
10
significant factor in preventing retailers from reducing shelf prices in response to wholesale price changes, or are
captured by the direct effect captured in the marginal retailing cost function. 
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retailer with the ability to exploit consumers’ expectations that prices should be higher.  In a
2 regime of falling commodity prices, ö  < 0 implies that retail margins widen as commodity prices
fall (the value of the margin is larger if commodity prices are falling).  Assuming wholesale prices
fall with commodity prices, retailers are not reducing their prices as a competitive, frictionless
equilibrium would suggest.   Researchers typically interpret this result as indirect evidence of
10
2 retailer market power (Lewis, 2004; Frey and Manera, 2007).  Alternatively, if ö  > 0, then retail
margins narrow as commodity prices fall – evidence that retailers are either willing to reduce
profits in order to maintain market share and are, indeed, highly competitive, or that wholesalers
do not pass reductions in their costs through to the retail level by reducing wholesale prices in a
12 timely manner.  Further, if both retail adjustment parameters are positive and ö  > ö  then retail
margins widen more completely when farm prices are rising than margins narrow when farm
prices are falling.  
The interpretation is similar on the manufacturer side, but the margin is defined as the
difference between total production cost (the farm price plus packing and distribution costs for
1 minimally processed items) and the wholesale price paid by retailers.  First, if è  < 0 then
wholesale margins fall as commodity prices rise – a situation in which wholesalers cannot pass on
1 higher farm prices to retailers.  On the other hand, if  è  > 0, then wholesale margins rise with
commodity prices, which is only possible if suppliers are able to obtain a pass-through rate of
2 greater than 100%.  When commodity prices are falling, è  < 0 implies that wholesale margins
rise.  This is precisely the situation retailers are arguing exists in the current environment (spring23
2009), where manufacturers are holding wholesale prices at levels justifiable during the
commodity price spike of 2008 despite the fact that farm prices are now dramatically lower. 
Although this could be due to contractual obligations, inventory purchases, hedging activities or
other internal pricing methods, it does appear to be a prima facie case of wholesaler market
2 power.  Conversely, if è  > 0, then wholesale margins fall when commodity prices are falling. 
This is to be expected if the wholesale sector is competitive and suppliers begin to undercut each
other in an attempt to gain market share. We test for each of these possible outcomes using the
retail and wholesale data described in the next section.  
Pass-Through Simulation
The conduct parameters described in the previous section measure only the direct effect of farm
price changes on each margin, but not the indirect effects through product substitution.  Therefore,
we calculate the implied pass-through rate from commodity prices for each product to its retail
price by introducing shocks to the commodity price and calculating the resulting change in retail
prices (Kim and Cotterill, 2008).  Expressing the response of retail prices in proportionate terms
provides an estimate of the theoretical pass-through rate.  In each case, we simulate pass-through
under the estimated game structure, and one that is more and one that is less competitive. The
resulting pass-through rates suggest whether we can evaluate the impact of imperfect competition
on price dynamics in minimally-processed food markets.  
RF Specifically, define the pass-through rate between farm and retail prices as: Ä .  To show
how this value is calculated, re-write the retail margin equation to explicitly include the arguments
of each cost function and simplify the markup notation so that: 24
rw where  m  is the retail markup and m  is the wholesale markup and b is the farm-price of the
commodity.  Notice from (20) that the retail price vector appears both on its own and as a
component of the wholesale and retail mark-up equations.  Therefore, we allow the farm price to
vary by a fixed amount (+ / - 10%), and then solve (20) implicitly for the price vector.  With this
solution, we then calculate the percentage change in retail prices that results from the change in
cost.  Using equation (20), we then calculate the pass-through for product j as: 
where the 1 superscript refers to the price and cost terms observed following the change in input
prices, and the 0 superscript is the base scenario.  Written this way, the pass-through rate is
interpreted in percentage terms and shows the proportion of each cost change that is passed
through to retail prices.  Values greater than 1.0 (100%) mean that retailers raise prices by more
than the increase in cost, and values less than 1.0 suggest that retailers absorb some of every cost
increase, perhaps to avoid losing market share.   
Data Description
The potato data consist of 143 weeks (week of January 8, 2006 through week of September 28,
2008) of market-level retail scanner data from five markets: Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Los
Angeles and New York.  The data consist of dollar sales, unit volume (pounds), promotion
(20)
(21)25
activity and attribute indicators for ten potato varieties (fingerling, Idaho, purple, red, red creamer,
russet, white, yellow, organic, other).  These data are from Fresh Look Marketing, Inc., Chicago,
Illinois.  Farm price data are from the United Potato Growers of America (UPGA) for each variety
and represent weekly FOB price data at the packing-house door.  Therefore, farm prices and
wholesale potato prices, which are unobserved in the above model, are not the same and are likely
to differ significantly depending on transportation costs, packing costs and other wholesale
services.  
Retail input prices consist of average weekly earnings of workers in the supermarket
industry, weekly retail management earnings and market-specific indices of commercial electricity
prices.  Wholesale input prices include an index of interest, taxes and insurance costs, a measure
of fuel prices (diesel fuel) and an index of business service costs.  All of these input prices are
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and are smoothed to produce weekly series from the
native monthly data.  In the potato demand model, the outside option is defined as the entire
potential market for table-potato sales.  We calculate the size of the whole market on a weekly
basis by multiplying the total metropolitan statistical area (MSA) population (Bureau of Census)
by the USDA estimate of per capita consumption of potatoes (ERS-USDA).  The difference
between the inside and the outside option is then reduced to potatoes sold through convenience
stores, food service outlets and retailers that do not participate in retail-scanner data syndication
(Wal-Mart, Costco, and other club and super stores).  Nevo (2001) and Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes (1995) follow similar strategies in creating a broad definition of the total potential market. 
Finally, we take random draws from the distribution of each demographic measure (household
income, age, education and household size) reported by the Current Population Survey (Bureau of26
Census) to capture market-specific variation in unobserved elements in the mixed logit demand
model.  The potato data is summarized in table 1a below. 
The data used for the milk model is similar in nature to the potato data, but reflects
inherent differences between data for fixed-weight consumer-packaged-goods and fresh, random-
weight products.  The data are again market-level retail scanner data, but represent 10 of the
largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the U.S. over the 104 week period from March 4,
2007 through February 22, 2009.  Therefore, both the potato and milk datasets capture the period
in 2008 where commodity prices were rising rapidly, and much of the subsequent decline.  We
focus our analysis on the top 18 brands by local market share, as many milk brands are market-
specific.  Additional attributes for the milk demand model include fat content, whether the brand
is organic or not, and if it is a private label.  All retail input prices are the same as those defined
above in the potato model (adjusted for time periods and markets), but we use an index of
packaging prices instead of the interest, taxes and insurance index used in the potato model. 
Summary statistics for the milk data are shown in table 1b below.  It is clear from tables 1a and 1b
that the “natural experiment” inherent in this scanner data, namely variation in price both over
time and over markets, is sufficient to identify the parameters that are the focus of our empirical
analysis. 
[tables 1a and 1b in here]
Estimation Method and Identification Strategy
For both products, we estimate the entire model in two stages.  We estimate the first-stage demand
model using simulated maximum likelihood (SML, Train, 2003) and the second stage using27
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM, Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993).  SML uses Monte
Carlo simulation to solve the integral in the demand equation up to an approximation that is
accurate to the number of random draws chosen, R. This method provides consistent parameter
estimates under general error assumptions and is readily able to accommodate complex structures
regarding consumer heterogeneity.  In order to speed the estimation process, we simulate the
multi-dimensional integral that defines the distribution of heterogeneity using R draws from a
Halton sequence (Train, 2003; Bhat, 2003).  We find that R = 50 draws are sufficient to produce
stable estimates without excessive estimation time.  Bhat (2003) provides experimental evidence
that shows Halton sequences can reduce the number of draws required to produce estimates at a
given accuracy by a factor of 10.  Although estimating in two stages is not maximally efficient, it
does produce consistent parameter estimates at each stage.  Because the second-stage GMM
estimates use estimated regressors from the first, demand-stage, however, the standard errors will
be inconsistent. Therefore, we estimate the model at this stage using the bootstrap estimator
described by Cameron and Trivedi (2005).  As a result, all inferences drawn from the supply-side
model estimates will be consistent. 
In aggregate, market-level scanner data, we assume retail prices are endogenous.  In other
words, some of the unobserved factors that are now in the econometric error term of the estimated
demand equation are likely to be highly correlated with observed prices: shelf-facing, display area,
in-store promotions and a host of other factors. Without an estimator that takes this into account,
all parameter estimates would biased and inconsistent.  Our identification strategy is well-
accepted in the literature.  Namely, we require instruments that are correlated with the endogenous
variables, but not the unobservables in the pricing equation.  Unobservable factors that are likely These estimation results are voluminous, but are available from the authors in a separate document. 
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to influence marketing margins for the products in question include such things as targeted,
market-specific advertising, chain-level merchandising efforts, or variations in local tastes that are
not captured by the demographic variables included in the demand model. 
Following others in this literature (Berto Villas-Boas, 2007; Draganska and Klapper,
2007) we use a variety of instruments.  First, we interact retail and production input prices with
the set of market binary variables.  Market-specific variation in costs will be correlated with prices
in the same market, but not likely to be correlated with unobservable factors in the margin
equations.  Second, we include a set of lagged share and margin values in order to pick up any
pre-determined pricing effects.  Third, we include product-specific binary variables to account for
idiosyncratic supply or quality factors that are unobservable to the econometrician but are clearly
important in determining either wholesale or retail margins.  First-stage instrumental variables
regressions show that this set of instruments explains over 90% of the variation in our endogenous
price and share variables.   In this way, we are confident that we can identify the market conduct
11
parameters that are key to our analysis of pass-through and market structure. 
Results and Discussion
In this section, several sets of estimation results are of interest.  We first present the demand
estimates for both products in order to establish the validity of the demand model and to highlight
features of each market that are likely to be relevant to retailers’ and wholesalers’ pass-through
behavior.   We then present the supply-side or pricing model estimates and tests of the central
hypotheses of the paper, namely, how commodity inflation influences pricing conduct and pass-29
through during periods of both rising and falling commodity prices.  
Table 2 provides estimates of the random-coefficient nested-logit potato demand model. 
We use a number of specification tests to establish the validity of the random-parameters nested
logit model.  We first test whether a nested logit specification is appropriate, or whether a simpler,
single-level logit model is preferred.  The null hypothesis in this case is whether the nested logit
J scale parameter, ó , is statistically different from zero.  A t-test of this hypothesis easily rejects the
null (t-ratio = 169.968) so we conclude that a nested logit is preferred.  Second, we test whether
the random parameters specification is preferred to the alternative by testing whether the standard
deviation of the price and intercept terms used to describe the unobserved heterogeneity in each
market are statistically significant.  Further, we conduct a log-likelihood ratio test in which the
unrestricted version (random coefficients) is compared to a restricted version (fixed coefficients). 
From the results in table 2, it is clear that both of these specification tests suggest that the random
coefficients version is superior, so we use this model as the basis of consumer demand and,
therefore, of retail and wholesale pricing. 
[table 2 in here]
A number of results from the retail potato demand model are of substantive interest for
potato marketers, and to establish the validity of the demand estimates.  First, the marginal utility
of income (price coefficient) is negative and significant, as expected.  Second, the discount effect
appears to shift the demand curve, and rotate demand in a clockwise direction (at a 10% level). 
Both of these effects are as retailers intend.  Third, the elasticity of substitution among stores is
J bound by 0 and 1, indicating that stores are close substitutes when preceding a potato purchase (ó
= 1 indicates perfect substitution).  Allowing for observed heterogeneity suggests that the As in the potato case, a Hausman (1978) test is used to test the null hypothesis that all retail and
12
wholesale prices are endogenous.  
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elasticity of demand rises (become more inelastic) in both age and education, which is expected as
consumers understand the value of fresh vegetables in a healthy diet.  The flexibility of the
random coefficients specification is evident from the matrix of demand elasticities shown in table
3.  While the own-price elasticities are less than zero, as expected, there is also considerable
variation in the cross-price elasticities with most varieties.  
[Table 3 here]
We expect that the demand elasticities for potatoes, which are a minimally processed
(cleaned and boxed) perishable item, will differ significantly from the brand-level milk estimates. 
Milk undergoes pasteurization, fortification, fat-reduction and packaging prior to reaching the
store, so is more highly differentiated than are potatoes.  Table 4 shows the results obtained by
estimating the full random coefficients model and an ordinary least squares version that does not
correct for the endogeneity of retail prices.   Summarizing the demand estimates, we again reject
12
the simple logit specification in favor of the nested alternative.  Using the nested logit estimates,
we find that price-promotion tends to shift the demand curve out during the promotion week, and
rotate it in a clockwise (more inelastic) direction.  As in the potato case, we again find significant
variation in the cross-price elasticities across products due to the flexibility of the random
coefficients approach.  Relative to the potato estimates, however, the branded nature of retail milk
sales means that the brand-level elasticities are much larger than the variety-level potato
elasticities.   
[tables 4 and 5 in here]31
We now present the results obtained by estimating both margin models: first for potatoes
and then for milk.  In table 6 we present two sets of results in the case of potato margins – the
second two columns assume a competitive supply sector so only allow for margin adjustment by
retailers, while the first two columns allow for both competitive retailers and wholesalers.  Prior
to interpreting the price-adjustment parameters, however, it is first necessary to establish the
validity of the GMM estimates.  We do so with mis-specification tests and general tests of
goodness of fit.  First, with a GMM estimator, a chi-square test that compares the estimated model
with a null alterative provides an indication of the overall goodness of fit of the model (Davidson
and MacKinnon, 2003).  From the results in table 6, based on critical chi-square values of 36.415
and 26.587 for the vertical and retail models, respectively, we reject the null hypothesis in each
case that the set of parameters is jointly equal to zero.  Second, we conduct a Hausman test
(Hausman, 1978) of the exogeneity of retail and wholesale prices using the vertical model.  With a
critical chi-square value of 12.089 and a test statistic value of 44.274, we conclude that prices
cannot be assumed to be exogenous, so the instrumental variables estimator is appropriate. 
Finally, we conduct a J-test of the overidentifying restrictions implied by the GMM estimator
(Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004).  The J-test is again chi-square distributed with degrees of
freedom equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions.  In the case of the vertical model, the
GMM objective function value is 271.14, so we conclude that the set of instruments is not ideal. 
However, a first-stage regression of the instruments on endogenous retail prices provides an R
2
value of 0.943, so we argue that this set is the best available to us and that the ideal set of
instrumental variables likely does not exist.  Consequently, we proceed to interpret the margin-
adjustment parameters using the estimated values reported in table 6.  Note that the farm price does not enter into the retail margin equation because raw commodity prices in
13
our model are not inputs to the retailer, but are to the wholesaler. 
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[table 6 in here]
Our primary concern is the adjustment of retail margins to change in the farm price, and
the interactions between retail and wholesale markup terms and the rate of farm price inflation. 
We interpret the former effect as the “direct” effect and the second as the “indirect” effect, or the
impact of farm price inflation on the ability of either retailers or wholesalers to charge above-
competitive margins.  These results of the supply side potato model are presented in table 6.  With
respect to the direct effect, we find that the estimated parameter in the vertical model is positive
and statistically significant from zero, indicating that the retail-cost (or total) margin rises by $0.68
per pound for every $1.00 per pound change in the price of potatoes, which implies a “partial”
pass-through of 89.6%, based on the average farm price.  We refer to the direct effect in this table
13
as a partial effect because the total pass-through rate must take into account the impact of cost
changes on equilibrium prices, both at the wholesale and retail levels.  
In terms of the indirect effect, the results in table 6 show that the fitted value of the retail
conduct parameter (which includes a constant, inflationary and deflationary effect) is 0.828 while
the fitted value of the wholesale conduct parameter is 0.248.  This implies that potato wholesalers
are nearly competitive, but retailers price nearer to the maintained monopoly level. 
Disaggregating pricing conduct into rising and falling input-price regimes, however, reveals more
1 information relevant to our objectives.  Recall that ö  refers to a regime in which commodity
21 2 prices are rising, ö  to when they are falling, and similarly for è  and è  with respect to the
wholesale mark-up term.  The fact that all four parameter estimates are negative for the potato33
results suggests that when commodity prices are rising, both retail and wholesale margins fall. 
Retailers are apparently unwilling to cede market share to competitors by raising prices, so absorb
some of the wholesale price increase, and require that their suppliers do so as well.  On the other
2 hand, when commodity prices are falling, the negative ö  estimate suggests that retail margins
rise.  Similar to the findings of many others in the asymmetric price-adjustment literature
(Kinnucan and Forker, 1987, for example), retailers are slow to reduce their price to consumers
when costs are falling in recognition of the temporary profits that are available.  
Unlike other studies, however, we also find that wholesale margins rise when commodity
2  prices are falling (è < 0).  This reflects the complaint voiced by retailers in the spring of 2009
following a rapid slide in commodity prices described above (Boyle, 2009).  While suppliers’
costs were clearly falling, they were not passing along all of their cost savings through lower
wholesale prices.  Our results support this allegation and, comparing the relative magnitude of the
two parameters, suggest that it was rather retailers that were benefitting more than the
manufacturers as the wholesale sector is considerably more competitive.  While the source of
suppliers’ pricing power lies in branding and loyalty, the spatial market power enjoyed by retailers
is evidently much stronger.  
We conduct the same set of specification tests for the milk margin model, with the same
qualitative results.  Consequently, we again interpret the direct and indirect pass-through estimates
using the vertical model.  In terms of the direct effect, the pass-through parameter of 0.066 implies
a pass-through rate of 3.4% at the mean farm price.  With respect to the indirect effects, the fitted
value of the retail conduct parameter is 0.289 and the wholesale conduct parameter is 0.542 –
opposite to the potato case where wholesalers were shown to be more competitive than retailers. 34
The net effect on pass-through rates, however, depends on whether input prices are rising or
falling.  The results in table 7 show that both wholesale and retail margins narrow when input
prices change in either direction.  How can this be?  First, consider suppliers.  When input prices
are rising, production costs rise relatively quickly because feed prices represent a large share of
the cost of producing milk.  Although suppliers appear to have more market power than retailers,
milk suppliers will be unable to pass these input cost increases onto retailers if retail margins
cannot widen sufficient to cover the higher wholesale prices.  Further, when input prices are
falling, wholesale margins do so as well.  When retailers expect wholesale prices to fall, they put
further pressure on suppliers to lower prices.  Because manufacturers’ costs are not falling as far
as retailers expect (raw milk is not 100% of production costs), margins narrow.  Second, on the
retail side, the relatively competitive nature of retailing forces retailers to absorb some of the price
increases in periods of rising prices.  As a result, retailers find themselves in a cost-price squeeze
as they attempt to maintain market share.  However, manufacturers seem to absorb a larger
portion of the rising food prices compared to retailers.  Additionally, when input prices fall
retailers are forced to cut prices.  Moreover, retailers have greater leverage over manufacturers to
lower wholesale prices because their expectation is that production costs have fallen with
commodity prices.  As a result, manufacturers are again forced to cede a greater share of their
margin as retailers press for a decrease in the wholesale cost in order to maintain market share.  In
summary, neither wholesalers nor retailers benefit from inflationary or deflationary periods in the
case of processed food items such as milk. 
[table 7 in here]
We then simulate equilibrium changes in the retail price, wholesale price and both margins35
when the farm price changes by a fixed amount. By comparing the resulting pass-through rates
between the estimated equilibrium and the extremes of perfect competition and collusion, we get a
better sense of the effect of the competitive conduct estimated in both models on the extent to
which farm price changes are translated into retail price inflation.  These results are shown in table
8 below for both potatoes and milk.  In general, our results agree with previous studies in that we
find the rate of cost-passthrough is lower for firms with market power relative to those without,
except in the case of a raw milk price increase.  However, our findings differ significantly by
product.  While the estimated deviation from competitive behavior in potatoes implies only a
slightly lower pass-through rate when commodity prices are rising, and -17.26% lower rate when
commodity prices are falling, for milk the difference is 31.56% when input prices are rising and
7.01% when they are falling.  This result appears to be counterintuitive, but recall that these
estimates describe a net effect of retail and wholesale margin changes.  For potatoes, wholesalers
reduce their margins more than sufficient to offset the opposite change by retailers, so the net
effect is actually a pass-through rate higher than the competitive benchmark.  This is consistent
with other “overshifting” results found in the public finance literature (Anderson, de Palma and
Kreider, 2001).  If firms set prices in a Bertrand-Nash fashion, then price complementarity in
differentiated products can lead to exactly this result. 
The implications of these results go beyond the two commodities studied here.  If
commodity-price inflation returns – as is widely expected – then policies directed at containing
the impact on consumer food prices should focus not only on the cost-share of the farm input, but
also the nature of the product itself.  If the food in question is highly differentiated and sold
through a vertical market with wholesalers and retailers, then multi-product, strategic pricing36
considerations will not only be important, but may dominate the argument.  As is common in
these situations, the efficient solution is more nuanced than the first reaction suggests.   
Conclusion and Implications
In this study, we estimate the direct and indirect pass-through of commodity price changes to the
retail prices of two differentiated food products.  Retail prices change directly as a result of either
higher or lower wholesale prices, but indirectly as commodity inflation changes either retailers’ or
wholesalers’ pricing power.   We estimate both effects using structural models of the US potato
and milk markets.  
We model pass-through using a structural model of each retail food market.  Demand is
assumed to be discrete, which we estimate using a random parameter, nested logit model.  Pricing
decisions are made in a two-stage, non-cooperative game framework by wholesalers and retailers. 
We derive the retail pricing equations directly from the first-order conditions for multi-product
retail profit maximization, and the wholesale pricing equations indirectly due to the
unobservability of wholesale prices.  For both retailers and wholesalers, pricing conduct is
allowed to deviate from either the competitive benchmark or complete collusion through the
inclusion of a conduct parameter.  Pricing conduct, in turn, depends on whether commodity prices
are rising or falling. 
Both the potato and milk models are estimated using instrumental variables methods.  We
use two-years of weekly scanner data that covers the periods of rapid commodity price inflation
and deflation observed during 2008 and 2009, respectively.  Our results show significant
differences in pass-through behavior between rising and falling commodity price regimes. 37
Specifically, both retail and wholesale margins in the potato market narrow when farm prices are
rising, but widen when they are falling.  Pass-through rates, however, are relatively high as the
wholesale market is nearly competitive.  These results suggest that retailers and wholesalers
exercise some pricing power and perhaps exploit buyers’ expectations that prices should still be
high when input prices are falling. 
For milk, both wholesale and retail margins narrow when commodity prices change in
either direction.  Because wholesalers are relatively non-competitive, pass-through rates for milk
are significantly lower than in the potato example.  Although wholesalers do have a degree of
market power, their ability to earn higher margins is constrained by how much margin retailers are
able to extract from consumers.  The difference in pass-through between the milk and potato
examples is primarily due to the level of perceived differentiation in the retail milk market. 
Whereas potatoes are typically regarded as commodities – even at the retail level – fluid milk is
increasingly becoming a differentiated product through nutritional additives, packaging and
brand-line extensions.  Clearly, price-complementarity among differentiated products sold by
Bertrand-Nash competitors creates a situation in which the usual policy prescriptions may need to
be more sensitive to the nature of the product and players involved, or abandoned entirely given
the inherent complexity of the relationships involved. 
Future research in this area should consider the effect of commodity price inflation on
equilibrium assortments offered by multi-product retailers.  Hamilton (2009) shows that rising
input prices should cause retailers to reduce the variety of products they offer, thus increasing the
per-product demand for each, and causing further pressure on the retail price to rise.  By jointly
endogenizing price and variety in an equilibrium framework, we will be able to determine more38
accurately the path between input price changes and wholesale. 39
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Table 1a. Potato Summary Data
Variable N Units Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Fingerling Share 7150 % 0.101 0.102 0.003 0.929
Idaho Share 7150 % 18.503 9.073 3.531 49.748
Other Share 7150 % 0.966 0.886 0.028 6.323
Purple Share 7150 % 0.032 0.033 0.004 0.225
Red Share 7150 % 13.651 4.817 6.476 39.576
Red Creamer Share 7150 % 2.558 1.628 0.329 16.584
Russet Share 7150 % 48.346 13.362 19.180 75.228
White Share 7150 % 8.644 6.404 0.852 43.813
Yellow Share 7150 % 6.159 3.053 1.444 17.797
Organic Share 7150 % 0.993 1.301 0.073 15.483
Fingerling Price 7150 $ / lb. 2.753 0.693 1.040 4.780
Idaho Price 7150 $ / lb. 0.629 0.161 0.330 1.130
Other Price  7150 $ / lb. 2.346 1.395 0.548 6.948
Purple Price 7150 $ / lb. 2.142 0.659 1.070 4.150
Red Price 7150 $ / lb. 0.811 0.134 0.450 1.330
Red Creamer Price 7150 $ / lb. 1.673 0.343 0.780 2.300
Russet Price 7150 $ / lb. 0.604 0.144 0.300 1.150
White Price 7150 $ / lb. 0.776 0.192 0.250 1.520
Yellow Price 7150 $ / lb. 0.973 0.195 0.570 1.460
Organic Price  7150 $ / lb. 0.981 0.253 0.331 1.760
Age 7150 Years 34.476 1.409 31.531 37.717
Education 7150 Years 10.278 0.330 9.576 10.868
Grocery Wages 7150 $ / Week 336.348 7.184 319.740 353.680
Management Wages 7150 $ / Week 771.007 42.879 695.400 849.780
Electricity 7150 Index 178.684 19.582 149.000 235.000
Interest, taxes and ins. 7150 Index 161.278 14.941 147.000 192.000
Fuel 7150 Index 283.924 61.819 218.000 426.000
Business Services 7150 Index 143.923 6.156 136.000 157.000
Potato Farm Price 7150 $ / lb. 0.076 0.028 0.050 0.182
Notes: Retail sales data represent aggregate scanner data from Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles and New York
for the time period Jan. 8, 2006 through Sept. 28, 2008.  44
Table 1b. Milk Summary Data
Variable N Units Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Brand 1 Share 104 % 25.172 11.811 0.815 53.250
Brand 2 Share 104 % 11.348 1.230 8.935 15.347
Brand 3 Share 104 % 10.733 4.772 0.527 22.835
Brand 4 Share 104 % 5.391 0.556 4.101 7.148
Brand 5 Share 104 % 4.164 2.510 0.924 14.971
Brand 6 Share 104 % 3.510 0.728 2.700 5.929
Brand 7 Share 104 % 2.579 1.801 0.652 6.898
Brand 8 Share 104 % 2.249 1.649 0.708 6.689
Brand 9 Share 104 % 1.826 0.360 1.378 2.755
Brand 10 Share 104 % 1.796 1.104 0.531 4.850
Brand 1 Price 104 $ / oz 0.028 0.003 0.020 0.033
Brand 2 Price 104 $ / oz 0.028 0.003 0.020 0.033
Brand 3 Price 104 $ / oz 0.034 0.003 0.025 0.038
Brand 4 price 104 $ / oz 0.034 0.003 0.024 0.038
Brand 5 Price 104 $ / oz 0.033 0.003 0.023 0.037
Brand 6 Price 104 $ / oz 0.029 0.003 0.018 0.033
Brand 7 Price 104 $ / oz 0.035 0.002 0.031 0.039
Brand 8 Price 104 $ / oz 0.029 0.003 0.020 0.034
Brand 9 Price 104 $ / oz 0.057 0.001 0.052 0.058
Brand 10 Price 104 $ / oz 0.035 0.002 0.031 0.039
Fat Content 104 % 1.144 0.811 0.000 0.200
Private Label 104 % 0.472 0.499 0.000 1.000
Organic 104 % 0.111 0.314 0.000 1.000
Education 18720 Years 10.603 0.407 10.084 11.220
Age 18720 Years 36.745 2.220 33.388 40.436
Grocery Wages 18720 $ / Week 339.803 5.591 329.700 353.680
Management Wages 18720 $ / Week 802.616 7.263 735.110 851.880
Electricity 18720 Index 170.938 5.645 163.200 181.600
Packaging 18720 Index 204.616 7.168 196.700 216.600
Fuel 18720 Index 277.683 71.538 159.600 422.600
Business Services 18720 Index 105.544 0.554 104.900 106.300
Milk Farm Price 18720 $ / lb. 0.194 0.027 0.145 0.219
Notes: Retail sales data represent scanner data from top ten brands chosen from market 1 over the time period March
4, 2007 through Feb. 22, 2009.  Identity of markets and brands is not disclosed as per a confidentiality agreement
with the data vendor.  45
Table 2. Random Coefficient Nested Logit Demand Estimates: Potatoes
Non-Random Parameter Model Random Parameter Model
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Discount 0.095* 5.195 0.092* 3.292
Discount*Price -0.032* -2.194 -0.031 -1.554
Atlanta, GA -0.749* -71.559 -0.751* -106.724
Chicago, IL -0.704* -67.492 -0.706* -115.973
Dallas, TX -0.051* -4.868 -0.053* -9.014
Los Angeles, CA 0.263* 24.978 0.262* 25.805
Fingerling -0.065* -3.345 -0.064 -0.753
Idaho 0.144* 6.905 0.142 1.702
Other 0.024 1.477 0.024 0.293
Purple -0.162* -7.097 -0.162 -1.895
Red  0.133* 6.625 0.132 0.972
Red Creamer 0.072* 4.368 0.071 0.614
Russet 0.187* 7.633 0.185 1.358
White 0.102* 5.603 0.099 0.893
Yellow 0.097* 5.507 0.095 0.604
Quarter 1 -0.126* -12.826 -0.121* -26.423
Quarter 2 -0.289* -29.293 -0.291* -65.126
Quarter 3 -0.351* -35.479 -0.348* -82.047
ó 0.954* 201.021 0.958* 169.968
          Price and Intercept Parameters
Price -0.016* -2.544 -0.026* -1.735
Constant -0.596* -22.237 -0.608* -7.242
          Standard Deviations of Random Parameters
Price  N.A. N.A. 0.013* 8.948
Constant N.A. N.A. 0.088* 43.466
          Random Parameter Functions
Price(Age) N.A. N.A. 0.004* 7.264
Price(Education) N.A. N.A. -0.009* -8.767
Constant(Age) N.A. N.A. -0.011* -13.733
Constant(Education) N.A. N.A. N.A. 28.154
LLF -897.127 272.221
Chi-square -16,826.913 544.443
 A single asterisk indicates significance at a 5.0% level. The chi-square statistic is twice the difference between the
1
simulated likelihood value and the likelihood of a null model (all parameters restricted to zero).  46
Table 3. Retail Potato Demand Elasticities: Top 10 Varieties, Average over all Markets 
Fingerling Idaho Other Purple Red  Red
Creamer Russet White Yellow Organic
Fingerling -1.674 0.035 0.007 0.001 0.033 0.012 0.085 0.018 0.018 0.003
Idaho 0.035 -0.314 0.041 0.035 0.067 0.046 0.118 0.052 0.052 0.037
Other 0.007 0.041 -1.415 0.006 0.038 0.018 0.090 0.024 0.023 0.009
Purple 0.001 0.035 0.006 -1.304 0.032 0.012 0.084 0.017 0.017 0.003
Red 0.033 0.067 0.038 0.032 -0.430 0.044 0.116 0.049 0.049 0.034
Red Creamer 0.012 0.046 0.018 0.012 0.044 -0.996 0.095 0.029 0.028 0.014
Russet 0.085 0.118 0.090 0.084 0.116 0.095 -0.200 0.101 0.101 0.086
White 0.018 0.052 0.024 0.017 0.049 0.029 0.101 -0.438 0.034 0.020
Yellow 0.018 0.052 0.023 0.017 0.049 0.028 0.101 0.034 -0.558 0.019
Organic 0.003 0.037 0.009 0.003 0.034 0.014 0.086 0.020 0.019 -0.592
Notes: Elasticities are averages for the top 10 varieties over all five markets.  Entries in the table are defined as the elasticity of the row variety with respect to
a change in the price of the column variety.  47
Table 4. Random Coefficient Nested Logit Demand Model: Milk
Non-Random Parameter Model Random Parameter Model
Variable Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Discount 0.000 0.021 0.002 0.836
Discount*Price -0.050 -0.474 -0.048 -0.689
Trend 0.000* 24.937 0.000* 80.574
Atlanta, GA -0.028* -12.937 -0.033* -25.514
Boston, MA 0.329* 141.369 0.315* 258.638
Dallas, TX -0.116* -52.765 -0.132* -102.821
Denver, CO -0.134* -60.719 -0.134* -106.055
Los Angeles, CA 1.666* 732.543 1.631* 1438.160
Minneapolis, MN -0.062* -26.410 -0.070* -59.060
New York, NY 0.883* 359.939 0.855* 718.125
Phoenix, AZ 0.552* 245.570 0.533* 430.821
San Francisco, CA 0.308* 136.427 0.293* 224.942
ó 0.998* 1515.852 0.998* 1826.743
         Price and Intercept Parameters
Price -0.112 -1.582 -0.653* -11.045
Constant| -2.374* -735.321 -2.365* -618.538
Fat Content 0.000 0.576 0.002 1.169
Binary Private Label 0.001 0.596 0.006* 3.328
Binary Organic| 0.000 -0.005 0.015* 6.661
         Standard Deviations of Random Parameters
Price N.A. N.A. 0.426* 84.167
Constant| N.A. N.A. 0.002* 8.037
Fat Content N.A. N.A. 0.003* 14.322
Binary Private Label N.A. N.A. 0.007* 23.822
Binary Organic N.A. N.A. 0.004* 4.988
         Random Parameter Functions
Price (Education) N.A. N.A. -0.012* -3.197
Price (Age) N.A. N.A. 0.014 1.820
Constant (Education) N.A. N.A. 0.000 0.782
Constant (Age) N.A. N.A. 0.001* 2.959
Fat Content (Education) N.A. N.A. 0.000 -0.366
Fat Content (Age) N.A. N.A. 0.000 -0.950
Bi. Private Label (Edu.) N.A. N.A. 0.000* -0.095
Bi. Private Label (Age) N.A. N.A. -0.001* -2.861
Binary Organic (Edu.) N.A. N.A. 0.000* -2.19448
Binary Organic (Age) N.A. N.A. 0.002* -3.690
LLF 24,218.36 30,547.03
Chi-square 48,536.72 61,094.06
 Interaction variables of education and age with fat content, private label, and the Organic variable are not shown.
1
A single asterisk indicates significance at a 5.0% level. The Chi-square statistic compares the LLF of the estimated
model to a null model with all non-constant parameters restricted to zero.  49
Table 5. Retail Milk Demand Elasticities: Market 1, Top 10 Brands 
Brand 1 Brand 2 Brand 3 Brand 4 Brand 5 Brand 6 Brand 7 Brand 8 Brand 9 Brand 10
Brand 1 -2.786 0.760 0.646 0.615 0.611 0.603 0.861 0.865 0.570 0.842
Brand 2 0.760 -3.119 0.393 0.276 0.236 0.222 0.408 0.418 0.206 0.368
Brand 3 0.646 0.393 -3.271 0.313 0.290 0.282 0.393 0.398 0.268 0.375
Brand 4 0.615 0.276 0.313 -4.890 0.167 0.157 0.233 0.239 0.149 0.207
Brand 5 0.611 0.236 0.290 0.167 -4.878 0.113 0.169 0.176 0.108 0.140
Brand 6 0.603 0.222 0.282 0.157 0.113 -4.604 0.149 0.156 0.098 0.120
Brand 7 0.861 0.408 0.393 0.233 0.169 0.149 -3.160 0.459 0.137 0.332
Brand 8 0.865 0.418 0.398 0.239 0.176 0.156 0.459 -3.827 0.143 0.357
Brand 9 0.570 0.206 0.268 0.149 0.108 0.098 0.137 0.143 -5.118 0.111
Brand 10 0.842 0.368 0.375 0.207 0.140 0.120 0.332 0.357 0.111 -4.082
Notes: Model includes 18 brands per market, with brands differing by market.  Top 10 brands for the first market are shown for presentation purposes only. 
Elasticities for the remaining brands and markets are available from the authors.  Entries in the table are defined as the elasticity of the row brand with respect to
a change in the price of the column brand.  50
Table 6. Retail and Wholesale Margin Model Estimates: Potato, GMM
Vertical Model Retailer Only Model
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Wholesale Inputs
   Packaging Cost 13.627* 3.577 N.A. N.A.
   Fuel Cost 1.240* 2.203 N.A. N.A.
   Business Services -40.931* -4.751 N.A. N.A.
Retail Inputs
   Grocery Wages 9.507* 5.161 7.381* 2.447
   Management Wages -1.313* -5.995 -0.516 -1.043 
   Electricity Cost -1.056* -5.617 -1.110 -1.659 
Farm Price 0.678* 8.103 N.A. N.A.
0    è 0.308* 3.481 N.A. N.A.
1    è -0.215* -9.770 N.A. N.A.
2    è -0.170* -11.017 N.A. N.A.
0    ö 0.840* 13.283 0.004* 1.813
1    ö -0.037 0.254   0.227* 0.765
2    ö -0.510* 2.026 -0.259 -0.459
Finglerling 3.893* 4.635 1.955* 1.900
Idaho 1.762* 2.099 -1.383* -1.368 
Other 3.830* 4.399 0.180* 0.177
Purple 3.219* 3.829 0.109* 0.108
Red 1.945* 2.316 -1.202* -1.189 
Red Creamer 2.418* 2.873 -0.597* -0.586 
Russet 1.723* 2.051 -1.425* -1.410 
White 1.929* 2.296 -1.243* -1.229
Yellow 2.108* 2.510 -1.033* -1.022





 A single asterisk indicates significance at a 5.0% level.  Instruments for markup terms include interactions
1
between input prices and variety-specific dummies, and lagged values of market share variables, promotion
j indicators and conditional shares.  è are components of the wholesale markup function (intercept, falling, rising
j wholesale prices, respectively) and ö parameters are components of the retail markup function.  51
Table 7. Retail and Wholesale Margin Model Estimates: Milk, GMM
Vertical Model Retailer Only Model
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Wholesale Inputs
   Packaging Cost -0.004* -12.129 N.A. N.A.
   Fuel Cost -34.013* -21.973 N.A. N.A.
   Business Services 0.720* 22.727 N.A. N.A.
Retail Inputs
   Grocery Wages -3.348* -15.514 -0.467 -38.198 
   Management Wages 40.428* 18.816 2.111* 52.729
   Electricity Cost 12.954* 11.545 -3.809* -48.593 
Farm Price 0.066* 6.727 N.A. N.A.
0    è 0.586* 30.853 N.A. N.A.
1    è -1.181* -11.538 N.A. N.A.
2    è 0.244* 3.267 N.A. N.A.
0    ö 0.064* 10.928 0.067* 18.957
1    ö -0.138* -6.223 0.053* 22.052
2    ö 0.091* 6.406 -0.082* -44.375 
Atlanta, GA -1.007* -9.251 0.319* 67.135
Boston, MA -1.014* -9.323 0.310* 65.637
Dallas, TX -1.014* -9.320 0.316* 66.558
Denver, CO -1.017* -9.347 0.308* 65.061
Los Angeles, CA -1.073* -9.906 0.343* 67.935
Minneapolis, MN -1.015* -9.327 0.302* 64.022
New York, NY -1.004* -9.224 0.321* 67.693
Phoenix, AZ -1.042* -9.584 0.335* 68.178
San Francisco, CA -1.012* -9.302 0.317* 66.751





  A single asterisk indicates significance at a 5.0% level.  Instruments for markup terms include interactions
1
between input prices and market-specific dummies, and lagged values of market share variables, promotion
j indicators and conditional shares.  The è parameters are components of the wholesale markup function (intercept,
j falling wholesale prices, and rising wholesale prices, respectively) and ö parameters are components of the retail
markup function.  52




ö = è = 0
(Comp)




ö = è = 0
(Comp)
ö = è = 1
(Monopoly)
j p
0 $0.778 $0.778 $0.778 $0.101 $0.101 $0.101
j Rising p
1 1 $0.846 $0.845 $0.815 $0.105 $0.108 $0.110
RF Ä 67.48% 67.83% 37.01% 4.49% 6.56% 8.85%
j p
0 $0.778 $0.778 $0.778 $0.101 $0.101 $0.101
j Falling p
1 $0.698 $0.710 $0.741 $0.095 $0.095 $0.097
RF Ä 79.54% 67.83% 37.02% 6.10% 6.56% 4.27%
RF j  In this table, Ä  is the pass-through rate between commodity and retail prices, p  is the initial fitted retail price
1 0
j (before commodity price increase), and p  is the new equilibrium price. 
1